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“A Stone of Hope”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Its Impact on the Economic Status of Black 
Americans1  
Jenny Bourne∗ 
INTRODUCTION  
Fifty years ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) carved 
American law anew.2 In particular, Title VII forbade employers, 
employment agencies, and labor organizations larger than a certain 
size from discriminating against individuals due to their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.3 Some have viewed Title VII as 
mostly symbolic because the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) established by the CRA initially had very 
limited power and resources. Others have considered it merely a 
continuation of change already in progress or a minor factor in 
improving the economic status of black Americans. In this Article, I 
examine the impact of Title VII on labor-market outcomes with 
high-precision data samples drawn from the U.S. federal censuses 
for 1940 through 2000 and the 2010 American Community Survey.4 
I find that real wages among employed, black, male household 
heads aged 20 to 60 years old increased sharply during the 1960s 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by JENNY BOURNE. 
 1. The title comes from a sermon delivered by Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr., at the National Cathedral on March 31, 1968. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution (Mar. 31, 1968), available at 
http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_re 
maining_awake_through_a_great_revolution [http://perma.cc/A4A4-5CMW] 
(archived Apr. 6, 2014) (“[W]e will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair 
the stone of hope.”). 
 ∗ Professor and Chair of Economics Department, Carleton College, 
Northfield, Minnesota. Professor Bourne gratefully acknowledges the superb 
editorial assistance given by Katherine Dampf and other members of the 
Louisiana Law Review. 
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 3. Title VII applied only to entities with 100 or more employees or members 
in the first year of enactment. Title VII, § 701(b) (1964). The relevant numbers 
were 75 for the second year, 50 for the third year, and 25 thereafter. Title VII,        
§ 701(e) (1964). Executive Order 11246 established the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance prohibiting racial discrimination among federal contractors with at 
least 50 employees. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
 4. Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, 
Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: 
Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/usa (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). I 
used the 1% IPUMS samples for 1940–1970 and 2010 and the 5% samples for 
1980–2000, appropriately weighted. 
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across all ages and educational levels.5 The largest spike in gains 
went to black men living in states covered by the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (VRA),6 particularly high school dropouts. On average, real 
wages increased both in absolute terms and relative to the wages of 
white men living in the same region. The growth rate in real wages 
for black men living in VRA states exceeded that for black men 
living elsewhere and for all white men from the 1960s onward, with 
the largest difference occurring in the decade of the ‘60s. Notably, 
employed black men living in VRA states earned less than half as 
much as employed black men of comparable age and educational 
background living in non-VRA states in the years 1940 to 1960, but 
the discount shrank significantly—to 30%—in 1970. Some of this 
was due to occupational shifts that would not have been possible 
before the CRA.  
These results comport with those found by Nobel laureate James 
Heckman, who is a leading supporter of the view that Title VII 
indeed mattered for the economic status of blacks, despite little 
funding to support its lofty goals. Part of the credit may be due to 
                                                                                                             
 5. The sample used throughout the Article consists of male household heads 
aged 20 to 60 years old. Focusing on this group isolates the experience of the 
primary bread-winner in families that were headed by men. In a tiny number of 
cases, these individuals were recorded as spouses of household heads. Because 
market outcomes may differ across gender due to differences in non-market 
activities, like housework and child care, see, e.g., Joni Hersch & Leslie S. 
Stratton, Housework and Wages, 37 J. OF HUM. RES. 217 (2002), I chose to focus 
on men only. In other work, I find that black women in 2000 participated more in 
the labor force than white women and their wages were close to parity after 
controlling for age, education, demographic, and household traits. Jenny Bourne 
Wahl, Residential Segregation and Labor-Market Outcomes: The Importance of 
Race, Gender, and Marital Status (Carleton College Department of Economics, 
Working Paper No. 2008-01, 2008), available at apps.carleton.edu/curricular 
/econ/assets/2008_01.pdf . Earlier work on female labor-market outcomes by race 
includes: Francine D. Blau & Andrea H. Beller, Black-White Earnings Over the 
1970s and 1980s: Gender Differences in Trends, 74 REV. ECON. & STATS. 276 
(1992) (finding that black women enjoyed even greater increases in annual 
earnings in the 1970s and 1980s than black men, as compared to their white 
counterparts) and James S. Cunningham & Nadja Zalokar, The Economic 
Progress of Black Women, 1940–1980: Occupational Distribution and Relative 
Wages, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 540 (1992). 
 6. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. The VRA 
was designed to remove remaining barriers to suffrage in states or districts where 
fewer than 50% of blacks were registered to vote. Id. States covered by the 
original legislation were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, and Virginia. Id. In addition, the 1965 Act covered several counties in 
North Carolina. Id. The Act was amended to include more jurisdictions in 1970 
and 1975, including the states of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas as well as various 
municipalities and counties. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-
285; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-73.  
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the voice given to blacks by the VRA. But, as Heckman and his co-
author John Donohue noted, Title VII may also have offered 
protective cover for southern employers who benefited from an 
externally imposed requirement that they hire from a larger qualified 
labor pool.7  
These findings also suggest that successful policy may start with 
something that seems simply symbolic. Four days before his death, 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke at the National Cathedral. There, 
he stated that “[g]reat documents are here to tell us something 
should be done.”8 The critical part for policymakers, of course, is 
ensuring that substance follows symbol. Lawmakers did reinforce 
the CRA in the years just following its passage with, for example, 
the VRA, the Fair Housing Act of 1968,9 and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.10 These measures truly did 
make a difference in the economic well-being of black Americans. 
Statistical analysis conducted in this Article indicates that the impact 
on black wages, particularly in states where racial disparity was 
most pronounced, was immediate, substantial, and lasting. 
More recent data suggest, however, that the task to establish 
racial equality in the United States is as yet unfinished. As of 2010, 
employed black men still earned on average 23% less than 
employed white men of similar age and educational background.11 
Relative to white men, black men continue to face unemployment 
rates that are twice as large and incarceration rates more than six 
times as large.12 What is more, nearly one-third of black, male 
household heads aged 20 to 60 do not participate in the labor 
force.13 
Today’s path to parity is not as clear-cut as the one designed 50 
years ago to deal with overt discrimination, and this Article does not 
attempt to construct it. Recent cases such as Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action14 and Shelby County v. Holder15 suggest, 
                                                                                                             
 7. John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1640 (1991). 
 8. King, supra note 1. 
 9. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968). 
 10. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 
103. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Parts III.A, C. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. Transcript of Oral Argument, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-682), available at http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-682_l537.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9 
4K-W5NS] (archived Apr. 6, 2014); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal., 134 S. Ct. 1623 
(2014) (upholding Michigan’s ban on using affirmative action for college 
admissions). Several states have such bans, and the Court seems likely to uphold 
them. Grant H. Blume & Mark C. Long, Changes in Levels of Affirmative Action 
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Figure 1:  Percentage of Blacks Living in the South, 
1900–1990 
Source: CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON 
POPULATION TOTALS BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970 
TO 1990, FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES (2002), 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056 
/twps0056.html [http://perma.cc/EBF8-GQU7] (archived May 18, 2014). 
however, that sweeping legislative changes of the sort enacted half a 
century ago are unlikely to be the means used by 21st-century 
Americans to promote greater racial equality.  
I. PREDECESSORS OF TITLE VII 
Figure 1 shows that 90% of American blacks lived in the South at 
the turn of the 20th century and more than half resided there in 
1960.16 So the story of black employment before and immediately 
after the CRA is predominantly a story of the South. 
 
                                                                                                             
 
in College Admissions in Response to Statewide Bans and Judicial Rulings, 36 
EDUC. EVAL. & POL. ANAL. (forthcoming 2014). 
 15. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). This case 
invalidated section 4 of the VRA, which required pre-clearance of changes in 
voting laws or practices in covered areas, leaving the law in limbo until Congress 
determines which parts of the country might be covered by it. Id. 
 16. The Bureau of the Census includes the following states (and federal 
district) in the South: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. CAMPBELL 
GIBSON & KAY JUNG, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULATION TOTALS 
BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970 TO 1990, FOR THE 
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES (2002). 
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Although most northern states had antidiscrimination laws 
before the CRA, southern states had nothing of the sort.17 Labor-
market discrimination often took the form of exclusion from jobs. 
Because many occupations at the time required “learning by doing,” 
this practice usually was not because blacks lacked skills or 
education.18 Southern employers could be choosy in hiring partly 
because of artificially high wages imposed by New Deal policies.19 
The racial wage gap was bigger in areas with a larger black 
population, more plantation activity in the past, and segregationist 
preferences (as determined by the proportion of the population 
voting for Strom Thurmond in the presidential election of 1948).20 
In fact, the proportion of the slave population in a southern county in 
1860 was one of the best predictors of the county’s racial wage gap 
in 1940.21 To improve their economic well-being, many blacks 
simply left the South after about 1910.22 At the beginning of the 
20th century, only 4% of blacks born in the South lived elsewhere, 
but by 1950 this figure was more than 20%.23 
On June 25, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 8802, the first federal action to promote equal 
treatment in the labor market.24 The order required federal agencies 
involved in defense production to ensure that job-training programs 
were administered without bias, prohibit discrimination by defense 
                                                                                                             
 17. William J. Collins, The Labor Market Impact of State-Level Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 1940–1960, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 244 (2003). The 
degree of enforcement of northern state laws was variable, but at least the laws 
were on the books.  
 18. James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South 
Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REVIEW 138 (1989). 
 19. Gavin Wright, The Civil Rights Revolution as Economic History, 59 J. 
ECON. HIST. 267, 278 (1999). A cornerstone of Roosevelt’s first 100 days in office 
was the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. 73–90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), 
which implemented a national minimum wage administered by the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA). Blacks referred to the NRA as the “Negro 
Removal Act” and “Negroes Ruined Again” for its effect on them. Ken I. Kersch, 
Blacks and Labor—The Untold Story, 148 NAT’L AFFAIRS 141 (2002). Although 
the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 
resuscitated many of its provisions.  
 20. William A. Sundstrom, The Geography of Wage Discrimination in the 
Pre-Civil Rights South, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 410, 412, 415 (2007). Of course, wage 
discrimination was only a part of what blacks suffered. Wright, supra note 19, at 
269. As late as 1961, theater managers in Durham held firm against a boycott 
campaign to integrate movie theaters. Id.  
 21. Sundstrom, supra note 20, at 412. 
 22. William J. Collins, When the Tide Turned: Immigration and the Delay of 
the Great Black Migration, 57 J. ECON. HISTORY 607 (1997). 
 23. ROBERT A. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH, 1880–1950: 
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 110 (1990). 
 24. The Law, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2014) [http://perma.cc/79CT-49FZ] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
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contractors, and establish the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC).25 Roosevelt released the order primarily to 
forestall a march on Washington planned by black activist A. Philip 
Randolph.26 
Congress terminated the FEPC in July 1945, cheered on by 
blatant bigot Theodore Bilbo, a senator from Mississippi.27 Bilbo 
had viciously denounced the Agency, calling particular attention to 
the racial and religious composition of its employees: “Do Senators 
propose that we spend $446,000 of the people’s money for 66 
Negroes, 12 Jews, a few gentiles, and two Japs?”28  
A year and a half after the demise of the FEPC, President Harry 
Truman established the President’s Committee on Civil Rights via 
Executive Order 9808.29 The Committee produced a report calling 
for anti-lynching laws, a permanent FEPC, a ban on poll taxes, and a 
stronger civil rights division in the Department of Justice.30 When 
Truman asked Congress to enact these recommendations, southern 
senators threatened a filibuster.31 So Truman went ahead on his own, 
appointing the first African-American federal judge and issuing 
Executive Order 9981 requiring full integration and equality of 
treatment across races within the armed forces.32 These actions, 
coupled with the earlier need for workers for the war effort, boosted 
black earnings in the 1940s. Still, considerable disparity remained. 
The median wage of black males was 41% that of white males in 
1939 and 54% in 1947.33 
                                                                                                             
 25. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938–1943), available at 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=72 (providing a complete 
transcript of the order entitled “Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense 
Industry”). 
 26. The march did not take place. For background, see Richard Wormser, 
Proposed March on Washington (1941), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow 
/stories_events_march.html (last visited June 2, 2014) [http://perma.cc/4NY2-
NF4Z] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
 27. Robert L. Fleegler, Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 
1938-1947, 66 J. MISS. HIST. 1, 15 (2006). 
 28. 79 CONG. REC. S6812 (1945). 
 29. Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Dec. 5, 1946). 
 30. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: 
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947), available 
at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights1.htm [http://perma.cc/4WQX-
FJBB] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
 31. See Monroe Billington, Civil Rights, President Truman and the South, 58 
J. NEGRO HIST. 127, 132–38 (1973). 
 32. Id.; Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). For an 
account of the time period, see Billington, supra note 31.  
 33. Richard B. Freeman, Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 
1948–72, 1973 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67 (1973). 
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During the administration of Dwight Eisenhower, Congress 
passed two pieces of legislation concerning civil rights, neither of 
which was particularly effective. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 
established a commission to protect people from interference with 
their constitutional rights,34 and the Civil Rights Act of 1960 gave 
the attorney general power to examine voting records and establish 
court-appointed referees to register voters.35  
Blacks increasingly voiced their frustrations with the lack of 
progress, primarily via non-violent means such as the Birmingham 
campaign led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and Fred Shuttlesworth of the 
Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights.36 The deaths of 
four African-American girls in the bombing of Birmingham’s 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church on September 15, 1963, breathed 
new life into the civil rights law proposed by President John F. 
Kennedy two months earlier.37 Kennedy’s own assassination two 
months after the Birmingham murders galvanized President Lyndon 
Johnson to push through legislation as a memorial to his 
predecessor, saying, “We have talked long enough in this country 
about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years or more. It 
is time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the books of 
law.”38 Despite strong opposition by southern Democrats such as 
Strom Thurmond (SC), Richard Russell (GA), and Robert Byrd 
(WV), President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into 
law exactly 188 years after the Continental Congress declared 
independence from Great Britain.39   
                                                                                                             
 34. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. 
 35. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86. 
 36. For a brief description, see Birmingham Campaign (1963), MARTIN 
LUTHER KING JR. & GLOBAL FREEDOM STRUGGLE, http://mlk-kpp01 
.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_birmingham_campaign 
[http://perma.cc/UP 2S-G98U] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
 37. John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on 
Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws 
/?pid=9271 [http://perma.cc/LM6F-6HF2] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
 38. Lyndon B. Johnson, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 
(Nov. 27, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25988 
[http://perma.cc/82T8-499H] (archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
 39. President Johnson signed the Act on July 2, 1963. Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Although Independence Day is celebrated 
on July 4 in honor of the day the Continental Congress ratified the text of the 
Declaration of Independence, the vote to declare independence actually took place 
on July 2. Charles Warren, Fourth of July Myths, 2 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 237 
(1945). 
1202 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
II. HOW IMPORTANT WAS TITLE VII IN IMPROVING THE LABOR–
MARKET EXPERIENCE OF BLACKS? 
A. The Significance of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
Relative wages for blacks markedly improved immediately after 
the passage of the CRA, despite the fact that the enforcement budget 
of the EEOC was initially quite small and the Commission had no 
power to initiate litigation.40 A piece of law that did have teeth, 
however, was the VRA.41 Figure 2 shows the enormous increase in 
black voter registration in southern states in the latter half of the 
1960s, and Figure 3 offers a state-by-state breakdown. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 40. The Commission did not gain this power until the Equal Opportunity Act 
of 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 
Stat. 103. This Act expanded coverage to entities with 15 or more workers and to 
state and local governments. Id. The budget and staff of the EEOC tripled from 
1970 to 1975, and the number of Title VII cases increased tenfold. James P. Smith 
& Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 269, 273 
(1984); FARRELL BLOCH, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND MINORITY 
EMPLOYMENT: RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS 92 
(1994); Kenneth Y. Chay, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on Black 
Economic Progress: Evidence from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 608, 610 (1998). 
 41. As mentioned, the VRA’s immediate predecessors—the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1957 and 1960, as well as a section of the 1964 Act—were not particularly 
effective. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; Civil Rights 
Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. But the VRA of 1965 established much greater federal 
oversight of the election process. Richard B. Freeman, Political Power, 
Desegregation, and Employment of Black Schoolteachers, 85 J. POLI. ECON. 299, 
304–05 (1977). 
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Figure 2: Registration Rate of Blacks in Southern States, 
1940–1988 
Source: GERALD JAYNES & ROBIN WILLIAMS, A COMMON DESTINY: 
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989).  
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Figure 3: Black Registered Voters by Selected States 
 % black of 
voting age 
% black of 
registered 
voters 
% black of 
voting age 
% black of 
registered 
voters 
 1960 1960 1970 1970 
SOUTH 
Mississippi 35.5 4.3 30.3 27.3 
Louisiana 28.2 13.7 26.0 20.7 
South Carolina 29.2 9.0 25.4 23.2 
Georgia 24.5 14.4 22.7 19.0 
Alabama 26.0 7.0 22.1 18.1 
Virginia 18.5 10.2 16.2 14.7 
Arkansas 18.2 12.2 14.7 16.1 
Tennessee 14.8 12.4 13.4 12.4 
Florida 14.7 8.9 11.9 10.2 
Texas 11.5 9.8 11.0 12.7 
North Carolina 20.8 10.1 8.7 12.4 
NORTH 
Illinois 9.3 8.6 11 10.2 
New York 8.1 7.5 10.7 9.9 
Michigan 8.7 8.1 10.2 9.5 
New Jersey 7.7 7.1 9.1 8.5 
Missouri 8.1 7.5 8.7 8.1 
Ohio 7.6 7.0 8.2 7.6 
California 4.2 4.0 6.1 5.7 
Indiana 5.3 4.9 6.0 5.5 
 
Source: Richard B. Freeman, Political Power, Desegregation, and 
Employment of Black Schoolteachers, 85 J. POLI. ECON. 299, 306 (1977). 
 
 
Voting rights mattered because they meant that people could 
elect or oust officials based on how well they represented 
individuals’ interests. Evidence shows that the VRA not only helped 
reinforce the tenets of Title VII but also aided in obtaining more 
school funding; improving street paving, garbage collection, and 
recreational facilities; and creating more equitable access to Federal 
Housing Administration loans and agricultural extension services.42 
                                                                                                             
 42. Wright, supra note 19, at 274. See also WILLIAM R. KEECH, THE IMPACT 
OF NEGRO VOTING: THE ROLE OF THE VOTE IN THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1968); 
Peter K. Eisinger, Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black 
Political Power, 76 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 380 (1982); LAWRENCE J. HANKS, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THREE GEORGIA COUNTIES 
(1987). 
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Figure 4: Ratio of Black to White Mean Wage, 
Employed Males Aged 20–60 By Residence, 1940–2010 
non-VRA states
VRA states
Note: “VRA” refers to the states covered by the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. Numbers do not control for differences in educational background 
or age distribution over time or across race. 
Source: Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald 
Goeken, Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series: Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/usa 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
The passage of the VRA also virtually ended the extreme racist 
rhetoric of southern politicians like Theodore Bilbo.43 
In the following three subsections, therefore, this Article looks 
closely at the differences between states that were covered by the 
VRA and those that were not.44 Figure 4 depicts the ratio of average 
wages for employed black men aged 20 to 60 to those of their white 
counterparts, graphed separately by region but not controlled for age 
distribution or educational levels over time or across race. The ratios 
in both regions increased through the 1940s, remained stagnant in 
the 1950s, and then jumped in the 1960s (particularly in the VRA 
states). The ratios grew closer in the 1960s and thereafter, indicating 
a more uniform relationship between black and white wages across 
regions.  
 
                                                                                                             
 43. Wright, supra note 19, at 274; HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, 
LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS 
AND INTERPRETATIONS (1997). Bilbo himself did not live to see the passage of the 
CRA and the VRA. Fleegler, supra note 27, at 26. He died of throat cancer on 
August 21, 1947. Id. 
 44. Because much of North Carolina was covered by the VRA, I included it 
in the VRA states.  
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B. Possible Explanations for the Narrowing Racial Wage Gap 
Some scholars have ascribed only a minimal role to the CRA in 
improving labor-market conditions for blacks during the mid-1960s, 
crediting the tight labor markets of the period for narrowing the 
racial wage gap.45 Others have attributed the gains to improvements 
in the quantity and quality of schooling received by blacks.46 Some 
have also speculated that increases in relative earnings for blacks 
were due in part to low-skilled blacks dropping out of the labor 
force.47 In contrast to these researchers, James Heckman argued in a 
series of papers that the CRA was in fact quite significant in 
advancing the labor-market status of blacks.48  
                                                                                                             
 45. James Tobin, On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro, 94 
DAEDALUS 878 (1965); Freeman, supra note 33; Wayne Vroman, Changes in 
Black Workers’ Relative Earnings: Evidence from the 1960s, in 2 PATTERNS OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 167 (G. von Furstenberg, A. Horowitz & B. Harrison 
eds., 1974); Wayne Vroman, Changes in the Labor Market Position of Black Men 
Since 1964, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH WINTER MEETING 294 (1975) [hereinafter Vroman, 
Changes in the Labor Market]; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 46. Finis Welch, Education and Racial Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN 
LABOR MARKETS 43 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); James P. 
Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black-White Male Wage Ratios: 1960–70, 67 AM. ECON. 
REV. 323 (1977) [hereinafter Smith & Welch, Black-White Male Rate Ratios: 
1960–70]; James P. Smith, Race and Human Capital, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 685 
(1984); JAMES P. SMITH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS (1986), available at http://www.rand.org 
/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3330.pdf [http://perma.cc/DLL5-2WNB] 
(archived Apr. 6, 2014); James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic 
Progress After Myrdal, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 519 (1989). 
 47. Chay, supra note 40. 
 48. See Heckman & Payner, supra note 18; James J. Heckman, The Central 
Role of the South in Accounting for the Economic Progress of Black Americans, 
80 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1990); Donohue & Heckman, supra note 7; see also 
Freeman, supra note 33; Andrea H. Beller, The Economics of Enforcement of an 
Anti-Discrimination Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. L. & 
ECON. 359 (1978); Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: 
Who Has Gained and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247 (Sherwin Rosen 
ed., 1981), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8913.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/7TQ6-HRC4] (archived Apr. 6, 2014); Vroman, Changes in the Labor Market, 
supra note 45; Charles Brown, Black–White Earnings Ratios Since the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: The Importance of Labor Market Dropouts, 99 Q. J. ECON. 31 
(1984); John Bound & Richard Freeman, Black Economic Progress: Erosion of 
the Post-1965 Gains in the 1980s?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 32 (Steven Shulman & William 
Darity eds., 1989) (using Current Population Survey data); David Card & Alan B. 
Krueger, Trends in Relative Black-White Earnings Revisited, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
85 (1993) (finding a significant break in 1964 using Social Security earnings data 
from 1957 to 1974).  
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To isolate the influence of civil rights legislation on black 
earnings, I ran a series of regressions on the natural log of real 
annual wages, controlling for age, race (where relevant), educational 
level, region of residence, and time period, among other things.49 
One set of regressions included only black male household heads 
aged 20 to 60.50 Another set included both black and white male 
household heads aged 20 to 60.51 The coefficients from these 
regressions allowed a comparison of wages across groups, as well as 
an estimation of growth rates in real wages over time for different 
groups. These in turn permitted me to evaluate some of the above-
mentioned explanations for the improved labor-market experience 
of blacks during the latter half of the 1960s. 
C. A Jump in Black Relative Earnings in the 1960s, Followed by 
Steady Improvement  
Black men who lived in VRA states in 1940, 1950, and 1960 
earned less than half of what black men in non-VRA states of 
similar age and educational background received. But, as Figure 5 
shows, the reduction in wages experienced by blacks relative to 
whites dramatically shrank to only 30% in 1970.52 This gap steadily 
diminished over time, and the reduction was down to 5.4% in 2010. 
These numbers suggest that the labor-market experience of black 
men living in VRA states was quite different from that of black men 
living elsewhere until the CRA and VRA were passed. Immediately 
following the legislation, the labor-market status for VRA-state 
blacks improved significantly in comparison to their non-VRA-state 
counterparts, with gradual improvement following in later decades.  
                                                                                                             
 49. The regressions were also controlled for age-squared, marital status, and 
work disabilities. I controlled for household head status as well, to account for the 
very few observations that listed the worker as the spouse of a household head. I 
converted all wage figures to dollars of 2010 to control for changes in price levels 
over time. In all cases, signs on coefficients were as expected—wages were higher 
for married men, household heads, and those without a disability. Wages were 
positively related to age and number of years of schooling and negatively related 
to age-squared.  
 50. These were difference-in-difference regressions with the comparison 
group being black high school graduates in non-VRA states in 2010.  
 51. These regressions were difference-in-difference-in-difference regressions 
with the comparison group being white high school graduates in non-VRA states 
in 2010.  
 52. The reduction in wages for white males living in VRA states (as 
compared to wages for white males living in non-VRA states) was 28% in 1940, 
19% in 1950, 18% in 1960, and 10% in 1970.  
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Figure 5:  Wage Discount for Employed Black Men in 
VRA States, 1940–2010 
Note:  Includes employed black males aged 20 to 60 who were a household 
head or married to a household head. Calculated from regressing the natural 
log of real wages on age, age-squared, marital status, household head status,  
disability status, educational background, and controls for census year and 
region of residence.  
Source: Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald 
Goeken, Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series: Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/usa (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
Black men living in VRA states in 1940 earned 79% less than 
white men of similar ages and educational backgrounds; the figure 
was 55% for men living in non-VRA states. In 1960 the discount 
was still 66% in VRA states although it had fallen to 33% in non-
VRA states.53 But in 1970, the discount shrank abruptly to 44% in 
VRA states (24% in non-VRA states). As shown by Figure 6, 
blacks’ earnings in VRA states have continued to improve 
somewhat, relative to that of comparable whites, while the racial gap 
in non-VRA states has remained about the same since 1980.54  
                                                                                                             
 53. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 7, at 1614 (finding that in 1960, 
southern black men aged 30 to 40 earned 57% less than white southerners, while 
the figure for the North was 32%).  
 54. The year 2010 is not reported because, by construction, all groups in a 
difference-in-difference-in-difference regression are compared to a single group—
here, white males living in non-VRA states in 2010. This allows for cross-
comparison of other groups as well, except in the base year. Other studies have 
found that the convergence in black–white earnings reversed during the 1980s, 
primarily due to increased returns to human capital and the relatively fewer 
average years of schooling for blacks. Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy & Brooks 
Pierce, Accounting for the Slowdown in Black–White Wage Convergence, in 
WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES: CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE UNITED STATES 107 
(C. Juhn, K. Murphy & B. Pierce eds., 1991), http://www.class.uh.edu/faculty 
/cjuhn/Papers/docs/JMP_1991_corrected.pdf [http://perma.cc/FP6R-B2W5] 
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Figures 5 and 6 suggest two things: blacks’ relative earnings 
continued to rise even during recessions, including the one in the 
mid-1970s, and relative earnings for black men improved 
substantially from 1960 to 1970, particularly for those living in 
VRA states. The first implies that the “tight-labor-market” 
hypothesis does not appear to be the primary explanation for the 
boost in black earnings during the 1960s because improvement 
continued even during economic downturns.55 The second suggests 
                                                                                                             
 
(archived Apr. 6, 2014); John Bound & Richard B. Freeman, What Went Wrong? 
The Erosion of Relative Earnings and Employment Among Young Black Men in 
the 1980s, 107 Q. J. ECON. 201 (1992); James P. Smith, Affirmative Action and the 
Racial Wage Gap, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (1993); David Card & Thomas 
Lemieux, Wage Dispersion, Returns to Skill, and Black–White Wage Dispersion, 
74 J. ECONOMETRICS 319 (1996). My estimates control for educational 
background, so this graph effectively compares blacks to whites who had similar 
years of schooling. 
 55. Richard Butler & James J. Heckman, The Government’s Impact on the 
Labor Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS & 
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Figure 6:  Wage Discount for Employed Black Males 
relative to Employed White Males by Region, 
1940–2000 
non-VRA
states
VRA states
Note:  Includes employed males aged 20 to 60 who were a household 
head or married to a household head.  Calculated from regressing the 
natural log of real wages on age, age-squared, marital status, household 
head status, disability status, educational background, and controls for 
census year, region of residence, and race. 
Source: Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald 
Goeken, Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series: Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/usa 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
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that increased education is not the main reason for higher relative 
wages for black men because the underlying regressions control for 
the level of schooling. Not only that, high-school dropouts comprise 
by far the majority of black men aged 20 to 60 up through 1970. The 
next Section explores in more detail the role of education in closing 
the racial wage gap. 
D. A Closer Look at The Role of Education 
Before the CRA, the typical black American male had less than 
a high school education. In 1940, those who had dropped out before 
(sometimes long before) high school graduation comprised 96% of 
black men living in VRA states and 90% of those residing in non-
VRA states.56 The figures are 94% and 83% for 1950, 86% and 73% 
for 1960, and 72% and 60% for 1970.57 By 1970, the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMs) data show that high school 
graduates accounted for 18% of black males living in VRA states 
(27% in non-VRA states).58 Despite the ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education,59 most blacks went to segregated schools through the 
early 1970s, particularly in the South.60  
Part of the reason blacks invested so little in schooling was that 
education simply did not pay off. Gavin Wright reported that, when 
the Rosenwald Fund tried to support black high schools in the South 
in the 1920s and 1930s, it did a survey of “black jobs” so as to adopt 
an appropriate curriculum.61 The survey found that no job for which 
a black would be hired required a high school education.62 So black 
schools simply did not offer courses like stenography, accounting, 
bookkeeping, or even typing.63 As late as the 1960s, auto-mechanic 
training appeared only in white schools, which explains why no 
blacks found jobs in the Ford plants located in Atlanta, Dallas, 
Memphis, and Norfolk in 1957 and 1958.64  
                                                                                                             
 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235 (L. Hausman et al. eds., 1977); Marshall H. Medoff, 
Discrimination and the Occupational Progress of Blacks Since 1950, 44 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 295, 300–01 (1985). 
 56. See supra note 4. 
 57. See supra note 4. 
 58. Blacks with at least a college diploma constituted only 1% of all blacks in 
VRA states in 1940 and only 2% in non-VRA states. By 1970, the percent had 
climbed to only 5% in both regions.  
 59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 60. Nathan D. Grawe & Jenny Bourne Wahl, Blacks, Whites, and Brown: 
Effects on the Earnings of Men and Their Sons, 13 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 455 (2009). 
 61. Wright, supra note 19, at 279. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. HERBERT NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: 
RACIAL POLICIES OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, REPORT NO. 1, at 67 (1968). 
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Some have downplayed the school-quality explanation for 
increased black wages, saying that black schools still had the same 
teachers even though they may have been paid more after the 
CRA.65 Yet the possibilities opened by Brown may have had 
incentive effects for black students (and, more importantly, their 
parents): The expectation of more wide-ranging labor market 
opportunities could have encouraged greater effort in school and 
thus more human capital to bring to a job.66  
To shed light on this issue, David Card and Alan Krueger 
documented an increase in the average number of years spent in 
school by blacks, better quality of black schools, and better returns 
to education for blacks over the 1960s and 1970s, with the last being 
most important.67 They determined that additional and improved 
schooling for blacks explains 15–20% of the narrowing of the racial 
earnings gap between 1960 and 1980.68 
To further investigate the role of education in my sample, I ran 
separate regressions for men with differing levels of schooling. 
Figure 7 shows the annual growth rate in real wages for each 
educational category by race and region, controlling for age and 
other demographic characteristics. Although I cannot control 
explicitly for changes in school quality or student effort over time, 
the results are nevertheless suggestive.69 Significantly, the growth 
rate in real wages was largest for blacks in VRA states, with an 
especially notable bump in the 1960s for men with less than a high 
school education.70  
 
                                                                                                             
 65. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 7, at 1621. 
 66. Grawe & Bourne Wahl, supra note 60. 
 67. David Card & Alan B. Krueger, School Quality and Black-White Relative 
Earnings: A Direct Assessment, 107 Q. J. ECON. 151, 153 (1992). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Some empirical work indicates that racial wage gaps disappear when 
measures of ability—such as scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test—are 
included. See June O’Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences 
Between Black and White Men, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1990, at 25; Derek A. 
Neal & William R. Johnson, The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage 
Differences, 104 J. POLI. ECON. 869 (1996); Joseph G. Altonji & Rebecca M. 
Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Market, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 3143 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Christopher R. 
Bollinger, Measurement Error in Human Capital and the Black-White Wage Gap, 
85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 578 (2003).  
 70. Richard J. Butler, James J. Heckman & Brook Payner, The Impact of the 
Economy and the State on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South 
Carolina, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE PAST 231 (David 
W. Galenson ed., 1989) (finding that blacks in blue-collar jobs accrued the greatest 
real relative wage gain in this decade). 
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Figure 7: Annual Growth Rate in Real Wages by Race, Region, and 
Educational Status, Employed Men Aged 20 to 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results of regressing the natural log of wages for employed 
male household heads aged 20 to 60 on age, age-squared, marital 
status, disability status, and dummy variables reflecting race, 
region of residence, and time period. 
Source:  Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, 
Ronald Goeken, Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
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E. So What Accounted for the Improvement in Black Relative 
Earnings? 
If tight labor markets and increased years of schooling cannot 
fully explain the jump in black earnings in the 1960s, the civil rights 
legislation enacted during that decade provides a plausible 
explanation for altered labor-market conditions. One suggestion is 
that the laws gave southern employers permission to do what they 
may have wanted to do but could not undertake individually for fear 
of reprisal by customers or existing workers. No single southern 
firm could hope to profit by hiring qualified blacks if its revenues 
fell more than its costs due to disgruntled racist employees or 
patrons who could take their skills or business elsewhere. But, if a 
law required all (or at least all larger) employers to treat races 
equally, firms could grumble about compliance but secretly reap the 
benefits of an expanded labor force.71  
What exactly was the means by which blacks made such large 
strides in relative earnings in the 1960s, particularly in VRA states? 
The main mechanisms appear to be the unwinding of occupational 
segregation, substantial desegregation of southern firms, and a move 
by blacks to larger employers. 
James Heckman and Brook Payner conducted the leading case 
study on the dismantling of occupational segregation.72 In the 1940s, 
91% of blacks worked in low-paying occupations.73 Heckman and 
Payner focused on the textile industry in South Carolina, which 
employed 80% of all state workers in manufacturing in 1940 and 
sold about 5% of its products to the federal government.74 Although 
nearly a quarter of adult blacks in the state were sufficiently well 
educated to work in the industry by 1960, they simply were not 
hired.75 But, between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of blacks 
employed in textiles jumped to 15%.76 Heckman and Payner 
attributed this primarily to the CRA (and Executive Order 11246, 
which forbade discrimination by government contractors).77 The 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Wright, supra note 19.  
 72. Heckman & Payner, supra note 18. See also Medoff, supra note 55. 
 73. Gerald D. Jaynes, The Labor Market Status of Black Americans: 1939–
1985, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1990, at 9. 
 74. Heckman & Payner, supra note 18, at 140. Workers in the industry still 
comprised 40% of all manufacturing employees in the state in 1980. Id. 
 75. Id. at 140. 
 76. Id. at 143. Some evidence indicates that occupational segregation 
increased during the 1980s and 1990s with the relaxation of federal oversight and 
regulation. See generally BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (1996). 
 77. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
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growth in real wages depicted in Figure 7, particularly for men with 
less than a high school education, is consistent with the findings of 
Heckman and Payner. The movement away from occupational 
segregation was reinforced by the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., which allowed evidence of disparate racial impact to indicate 
discrimination.78  
More generally, desegregation within firms occurred across the 
South. Between 1940 and 1965, more than 90% of new 
manufacturing jobs had gone to whites even though nearly half the 
population was black.79 In 1966, more than 50% of EEOC-reporting 
workplaces had no black male employees (more than 70% had no 
black females).80 After the CRA, integration came quickly.81 This 
mostly occurred in the private sector because blacks had already 
found some success in the public sector.82 The percentage of male 
managers who were black went from 2.1% to 3.5% from 1964 to 
1972.83 
Not only did blacks move into new occupations and new firms, 
they migrated to the larger firms covered by the CRA.84 Research 
has established that larger firms generally pay higher wages, so 
blacks could doubly reap benefits from their newfound ability to 
obtain employment at bigger establishments.85 
F. The Relevance of Voting with One’s Feet 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the CRA made a difference, 
particularly in states covered by the VRA, is that blacks stopped 
                                                                                                             
 78. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); William M. Wiecek & 
Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Confronting Structural 
Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095 (2014) (offering a detailed 
discussion about how the Griggs ruling has eroded over time). 
 79. Wright, supra note 19, at 279. 
 80. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Kevin Stainback, Discrimination and 
Desegregation: Equal Opportunity Progress in U.S. Private Sector Workplaces 
Since the Civil Rights Act, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLI. & SOC. SCI. 49, 63–65, 
75 (2007). 
 81. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 7, at 1606; Orley Ashenfelter & James 
Heckman, Measuring the Effect of an Antidiscrimination Program (Princeton U. 
Indus. Rel. Sec., Working Paper No. 52, 1976), available at http://arks.princeton 
.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01rj430455t; Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback, supra note 80. 
 82. William J. Carrington, Kristin McCue & Brooks Pierce, Using 
Establishment Size to Measure the Impact of Title VII and Affirmative Action, 35 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 503 (2000).  
 83. Freeman, supra note 33, at 86. 
 84. Ashenfelter & Heckman, supra note 81; Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact 
of Affirmative Action on Employment, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 439 (1984); Heckman & 
Payner, supra note 18; Carrington et al., supra note 82. See also Chay, supra note 
40 (finding that blacks benefited when they moved to smaller firms once the 
EEOC started covering them). 
 85. Charles Brown & Marshall Medoff, The Employer Size–Wage Effect, 97 
J. POLI. ECON. 1027 (1989). 
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Figure 8: Net Migration from the South by Race (000s), 
1910s–1980s 
blacks
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Note:  Negative numbers indicate the proportion of the relevant population 
leaving the South over the given decade; positive numbers show the 
proportion of the relevant population ascribed to in-migration over the 
given decade.  
Sources:  HIST. STATS. OF THE U.S., http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb 
/HSUSEntryServlet (last visited May 18, 2014) [http://perma.cc/B26Z-
FGW7] (archived May 18, 2014); Gavin Wright, The Civil Rights 
Revolution as Economic History, 59 J. ECON. HISTORY 267, 281 (1999).  
moving out of the South. In fact, they began a reverse migration that 
continues to this day.86 Figure 8 shows net migration from the South 
for blacks and whites. More than 1.5 million blacks left the South 
during the 1940s, comprising more than 15% of the South’s black 
population. By the 1970s, however, the flow had reversed, with net 
in-migration adding to the South’s black population.87 
 
                                                                                                             
 86. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 7, at 1604. On more recent patterns of 
migration, see Calvin Beale & Glenn Fuguitt, Migration of Retirement-Age Blacks 
to Nonmetropolitan Areas in the 1990s, 76 RURAL SOC. 31 (2011); William H. 
Frey & Kao-Lee Liaw, Migration Within the United States: Role of Race-
Ethnicity, 6 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 207 (2005); WILLIAM 
H. FREY, CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, THE NEW GREAT MIGRATION: 
BLACK AMERICANS’ RETURN TO THE SOUTH, 1965–2000 (2004), http://www 
.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2004/5/demographics%20frey/2004
0524_frey.pdf [http://perma.cc/JT46-27U8] (archived Apr. 6, 2014).  
 87. This may have indirectly contributed to the narrowing of the wage gap 
between blacks in VRA and non-VRA states if, as seems likely, blacks who 
migrated out of VRA states generally tended to have greater ability and 
confidence. If these individuals remained in the South after the CRA rather than 
heading north, regional differences in black productivity arguably shrank, leading 
to a concomitantly smaller difference in wages among blacks across regions. This 
argument cannot explain the reduction in the wage gap between blacks and whites 
in both regions after the passage of the CRA, however.  
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III. WHAT ABOUT MEASURES OF WELL-BEING OTHER THAN 
EARNINGS? 
A. Unemployment 
The march on Washington in August 1963 by thousands of 
black Americans (joined by many whites) was about civil rights, but 
it was also about employment; it was styled the “March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom.”88 Black male earnings have 
improved relative to those of whites, particularly in VRA states, but 
Figure 9 makes clear that the same cannot be said for unemployment 
rates. As one scholar put it, the black unemployment rate is always 
double that of whites, in good times or bad.89 The civil rights 
legislation of the mid-1960s and beyond has done little to change 
that relationship.  
  
                                                                                                             
 88. For a copy of the official program from the March, see Official Program 
for the March on Washington (1963), 100 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS, http://www 
.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=96 (last visited June 2, 2014) [http://perma.cc 
/5XHV-4GS6] (archived June 2, 2014). 
 89. Mathew Forstater, From Civil Rights to Economic Security: Bayard 
Rustin and the African-American Struggle for Full Employment, 1945–1978, 36 
INT’L J. POLI. ECON. 63 (2007). 
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Figure 9: Percentage Unemployed by Race and 
Residence, Males Aged 20–60, 1940–2010 
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Note:  “VRA”  refers to the states covered by the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. 
Source: Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald 
Goeken, Matthew Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series: Version 5.0, IPUMS USA, https://usa.ipums.org/usa 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
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B. Non-Participation in the Labor Force 
Earnings and unemployment rates do not tell the full story of the 
labor market. Unemployment rates include only those who 
participate in the labor force. For a variety of reasons, some people 
do not participate at all. They could be attending school, caring for 
family members, or suffering from a disability. Or they may not 
participate because the alternatives are more financially attractive—
subsisting on transfer payments or engaging in illegal activities.  
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society income-maintenance programs 
arose at about the same time as the CRA,90 and some researchers 
have speculated that the convergence in black–white wages during 
the 1960s could have been attributable to low-skilled and poorly 
educated blacks dropping out of the labor force.91 My data do not 
permit an examination of this possibility, but other scholars have 
evaluated the role of non-participation. They find that, even 
controlling for labor-market dropouts, the improvement in black 
relative wages during the 1960s remains.92 
Today is perhaps another story. Figure 10 shows that labor-force 
nonparticipation rates have climbed, particularly for black men.93 
Some research suggests that labor-market dropouts may be driving 
most of the convergence in wages observed over the last several 
years.94 Chinhui Juhn reported that, in 1967, about 13% of black 
men with 1 to 30 years of experience were not employed in a typical 
week. In 1999, the figure was 21%.95 Over 14% of experienced 
                                                                                                             
 90. For a discussion of these programs, see Emiel W. Owens, Income 
Maintenance Programs in the 1960’s: A Survey, 54 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 342 
(1972).  
 91. Brown, supra note 48; Smith & Welch, Black-White Male Rate Ratios: 
1960–70, supra note 46; Chinhui Juhn, Labor Market Dropouts and Trends in the 
Wages of Black and White Men, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 643 (2003). 
 92. Juhn, supra note 91, at 643. 
 93. I would have liked to examine the hours and weeks worked over time by 
race, but unfortunately some samples do not include these variables. All samples 
do, however, contain an employment status variable that indicates whether the 
person was employed, unemployed, or not participating in the labor force at the 
time he responded to the census. For more detailed information about 
unemployment and labor force participation today, see U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2011 
(2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/P79Y-XUG6] 
(archived Apr. 6, 2014). 
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ECON. 79 (1992). 
 95. Juhn, supra note 94. 
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black men did not work over the entire year of 1999.96 Elsewhere, I 
have found that single, black, male household heads were employed 
at much lower rates than comparable whites in 2000. This was 
especially true for men with less education.97  
 
 
C. Incarceration Rates 
My data do not include men who are living in group quarters, 
which include jails and prisons. Yet black men are incarcerated at a 
much higher rate than white men, and that divergence has increased 
substantially, as Figure 11 depicts. Black men went to prison 3.4 
times as often as white men in 1990; that number jumped to 7.7 in 
2000, falling slightly to 6.4 in 2010. Explanations for this 
discrepancy vary, but the important point here is that the 
examination of labor force data cannot provide the full picture of 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. 
 97. Bourne Wahl, supra note 5, at 15. 
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Sources: LAUREN GLAZE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2010 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail 
&iid=2237 [http://perma.cc/54MV-XM5G] (archived May 18, 2014); ALLEN 
BECK & PAIGE HARRISON, PRISONERS IN 2000 (2001), http://www.bjs.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf [http://perma.cc/VMR4-7TS8] (archived May 18, 
2014); HIST. STATS. OF THE U.S., http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/HS 
USEntryServlet (last visited May 18, 2014) [http://perma.cc/B26Z-FGW7] 
(archived May 18, 2014). 
economic well-being when a substantial proportion of one race is 
ineligible for ordinary employment.98  
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D. Female-Headed Households 
Examining only the experience of males ignores the major 
changes in family structure that have transpired since the passage of 
the CRA. Some scholars suggest that erosion in the economic well-
being of black families has occurred partly because of the vast 
increase in female-headed households.99 In 1970, 9% of white 
households with children under age 18 were headed by a single 
mother, whereas the proportion of black households was one-third. 
Today, the figures are one-fifth for whites and more than one-half 
for blacks.100 
E. Residential Segregation  
One reason that blacks today might earn less than comparable 
whites is because they live in different neighborhoods. Some 
scholars have found that segregation in housing has a negative effect 
on the earnings of blacks but little impact on those of whites, ceteris 
paribus.101  
A potential explanation is spatial mismatch of housing and jobs 
for blacks.102 Inability to afford a car or limited access to public 
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transportation can make things worse.103 Adding to black isolation is 
the increasing re-segregation of schools.104 Statistical discrimination 
in hiring could therefore result from a lack of contact between 
races.105 This could give rise to a dearth of positive role models and 
networking possibilities in black neighborhoods, making labor-
market success even more difficult to achieve.106 Particularly 
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sobering is that even if no one is prejudiced, no one prefers 
associating with persons of their own race, everyone believes that 
people of different races have similar average productivity, and 
everyone is rational, there is still a possibility that differences in 
labor-market treatment will arise due to segregation in housing and 
schooling simply because people tend to hire those with familiar 
backgrounds.107  
Residential segregation clearly is not the only reason for the 
racial wage gap. Of U.S. metropolitan areas with populations greater 
than one million in 2000, 20 of the top 25 most-segregated areas 
were in the North.108 The most segregated cities in the nation were 
Gary, Detroit, Milwaukee, New York, and Chicago.109 But this does 
not mean that the South provides a more equitable labor market for 
blacks, despite its relatively greater degree of residential 
integration.110 Figures 5 and 6 show that the racial wage gap is still 
relatively larger in VRA states. At a municipal level, wages in 
Detroit and Milwaukee are actually much closer to racial parity than 
wages in Atlanta and Washington, D.C.111 But earnings equity 
among the employed clearly is not all that matters—the former rank 
among the worst and the latter among the best cities for blacks to 
live, according to a recent survey by Black Enterprise magazine.112  
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F. Evidence of Persistent Labor-Market Discrimination 
The numbers suggest that some measures of well-being show 
improvements in the economic position of blacks in this country 
whereas others do not. This raises the important question: Has Title 
VII of the CRA (as amended) eliminated discrimination in the labor 
market? William Wiecek and Judy Hamilton, writing for this 
symposium, conclude that the answer is no.113 Paired-audit 
studies—in which comparable blacks and whites applied for the 
same job—imply that racial differences in hiring persist.114 Other 
research indicates that blacks and whites do not receive similar 
amounts of on-the-job training.115 
G. Life Expectancy, Infant Mortality, Public Accommodations, 
Happiness, and Perceptions of Equitable Treatment 
Certainly, labor market treatment and outcomes are not the only 
measures of well-being. This Article discusses four other areas in 
which whites and blacks encounter differences—life expectancy, 
infant mortality rates, access to hotels and restaurants, and 
happiness—and briefly describes how these differences have 
changed over time. 
Both whites and blacks have enjoyed an increase in life 
expectancy since 1940, and the racial gap has narrowed. The 
difference between life expectancy at birth for whites and blacks 
was 11 years in 1940, 7.5 years in 1960, 6 years in 1980, and 4.5 
years in 2008.116 
Black–white infant mortality rates started to converge shortly 
after the passage of the CRA. But the trend reversed during the 
1980s and 1990s: The black rate was 2.15 times the size of the white 
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rate in 1979 but 2.52 times its size in 1999.117 Since then, the ratio 
has fallen to a still substantial 2.38 in 2009.118 
One area of unquestioned progress is in the removal of racial 
obstacles in public accommodations. The inability to find lodging 
and meals made moving about difficult and dangerous for blacks in 
the first half of the 20th century. Gavin Wright suggested that one 
large benefit of the CRA was its effect in eradicating discrimination 
in public accommodations for eating and sleeping, which were 
among the most sensitive issues associated with the color line.119 As 
late as 1964, he reported that three of Chapel Hill’s five motels did 
not accept blacks and one-third of local restaurants had some 
discriminatory policy.120 Those days seem largely gone. 
Happiness is perhaps the most direct measure of well-being but 
also the most elusive to estimate. In an innovative study, Betsey 
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers combed through several years of data 
from the General Social Survey in an attempt to assess whether 
blacks have become happier relative to whites.121 They concluded 
that the answer is yes.122 But they also suggested that part of the 
closure in the happiness gap has come about due to an increase in 
unhappiness among whites, particularly white women.123  
Other data from the General Social Survey show that blacks and 
whites continue to hold very different perceptions. When asked in 
2010 whether blacks on average have worse jobs, income, and 
housing because of discrimination, whites replied “yes” 31% of the 
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time while blacks said “yes” 62% of the time.124 Both of these 
numbers have declined since 1985 (from 42% and 78%, 
respectively), but the gap is still quite large.125 When asked to rank 
on a scale of 1 (very committed) to 7 (lacking in commitment) 
whether whites have a commitment to fair and equal treatment of all 
groups in society, 22% of whites answered 5, 6, or 7, but 42% of 
blacks chose these three categories.126 When asked whether the 
government was spending the right amount of money to ensure 
equal treatment of different groups, 27% of whites said the 
expenditure was too small but 24% thought it was too large.127 
Among blacks, the answers were 80% and 2%, respectively.128 
CONCLUSION 
The civil rights legislation passed half a century ago made a 
significant and immediate difference in the economic well-being of 
black Americans. As scholars John Donohue and James Heckman 
put it, what happened in the latter half of the 1960s was not just a 
continuation of the progress blacks had seen for the previous 25 
years but rather a real upward shift.129 My investigation of micro-
level census data confirms this, particularly for blacks living in the 
states covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.130 The shift was 
permanent: Not only did black males in VRA states see a significant 
and sustained rise in their earnings relative to blacks of comparable 
age and educational attainment who lived elsewhere, but the wages 
of black men relative to similarly educated white men also increased 
substantially, particularly in states covered by the VRA.131 
But the economic well-being of black Americans still lags 
behind that of whites; on average, blacks consider this a larger 
problem than whites and are more likely to attribute it to 
discrimination.132 Black males with educational backgrounds similar 
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to those of white males have seen a closing of the wage gap, but a 
gap nevertheless remains.133 Blacks continue to have relatively 
higher unemployment and labor-market dropout rates.134 What is 
more, blacks on average enter the labor market with lower levels of 
schooling and do not receive as much occupational training.135 
Persistent residential segregation and increasingly re-segregated 
schools are part of the U.S. landscape.136 These features potentially 
create a spatial mismatch of housing and jobs that disproportionately 
affect blacks. They also generate a world in which blacks and whites 
are even more isolated from one another. Other factors contributing 
to the continuing discrepancies between races are much lower 
relative wealth137 (meaning less of a cushion in tough times), a 
relatively larger incarceration rate,138 and a relatively higher 
proportion of female-headed households among blacks.139  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a stone of hope for black 
Americans. Its Title VII furnished a bedrock foundation for abrupt 
improvement in labor-market outcomes, particularly relative 
earnings of black men in states covered by the Voting Rights Act 
passed one year later. But the monumental task it set out to achieve 
is not done. President Lyndon Johnson put it well in his special 
message to Congress imploring it to pass the VRA:  
[R]arely in any time does an issue lay bare the secret heart of 
America itself. Rarely are we met with a challenge, not to 
our growth or abundance, our welfare or our security, but 
rather to the values and the purposes and the meaning of our 
beloved Nation. The issue of equal rights for American 
Negroes is such an issue. And should we defeat every 
enemy, should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, 
and still be unequal to this issue, then we will have failed as 
a people and as a nation.140 
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